Issue 6 Vol I, December 31, 2005

defence

There is no clear cut command structure to effectively and efficiently utilize the forces, inadequate compensation, absence of appropriate arms and equipment and lack of motivation among the troops are some of the main reasons that are hindering counter terrorism operations in India especially in northern Jammu & Kashmir and volatile North Eastern region.

Our reactions in the past to various situations have been knee jerk and even today we neither have a long term policy nor a dedicated suitable force to deal with terrorism. In J & K in the past few years, for example, the Army had to deploy many formations hitherto force located in peace stations or those which were deployed in other border areas. The Army also raised Rashtriya Rifle units and formations which are deployed in the interior grid for internal security.

In order to check the menace of terrorism, the concept of a unified command needs to be firmly put in force both in latter and spirit. Currently even though the Army supported by other para military units, Central Police Forces and state police is utilised for the task, there is no clear cut command and control structure to effectively and efficiently utilise these forces.

Moreover, the task of countering terrorism is handled by the Ministry of Home whereas the main organ employed for it belongs to the Ministry of Defence. In a war scenario the pulling out of Army units from the internal security grid causes serious vacuums and the troops need reorientation to undertake their assigned operational roles. This needs to be reconsidered.

Creation of Rashtriya Rifle (R. R.) formations and units, fully officered and mannered by the Army personnel, is a serious drain on the manpower and equipment of the basic Army formations and units. These heterogeneous units lack the cohesiveness and potential of regular units. Even rotation of troops from regular units to RR Units poses a serious problem in maintaining peace and field profiles of troops.

In addition, the compensation to casualties in counter terrorist operations or in disturbed areas varies from force to force, from time to time and state to state. This causes frustration amongst troops. In such a scenario how will they be motivated to fight terrorists when their mind is occupied with other issues?

That is not all. The intelligence inputs are usually vague, non specific, general and mostly it is recounting of history. The intelligence agencies of various forces operate in their own styles and spheres and hardly share the information with each other or with the commanders in the field. The control of intelligence agencies is rarely vested in the operational commanders and these agencies are not answerable to commanders of troops in the field. This results in diffusion of effort. One single factor that causes exhaustion of troops and their extended deployment is the non availability of actionable intelligence.

The standard of Arms and equipment as well as the training and motivation of certain central and state police forces leaves them at a clear disadvantage vis-a-vis the terrorists and it reflects in the form of higher causalities and stress on these troops.

Even though apprehending or killing terrorists and recovery of arms, ammunition and explosives does reflect effectiveness of a unit these should not be made a yardstick by the formation Headquarters to grade units as this at times generates unhealthy competition amongst units which becomes counter productive and at times results in alienation of locals.

The Army and other forces employed for counter terrorist operations are generally not involved in the welfare or development schemes of the area by the civil administration. If this is done in institutionalized manners it will go a long way in these forces winning the heart and soul of the local population. It is by work and action on ground that these forces can generate the feeling amongst the locals that they are synonymous with security, dignity, welfare and prosperity.

The apprehended terrorists are not brought to quick justice and this not only demoralizes the troops and commanders it also helps the terrorists organizations indirectly.

To counter terrorism it is essential at psychological level to convince the rank and file of the terrorists that their cause is flawed and futility of its achievement by terror tactics. It is also essential to prove to them on ground that the efficiency of the security forces is such that the chances of their operations to succeed are minimal and these would mostly result in the terrorists losing life or getting apprehended. There is also the prime need to generate a sense of security and dignity amongst the locals which can be achieved through coordinated efforts of the civil administration, security forces, intelligence agencies and local population.

India is marked by long borders where a war on two fronts cannot be ruled out, utilization of Army in counter terrorist operations in perpetuity is not desirable. The Ministry of Home needs to arm, equip and train a specific force may be the CRPF/BSF to be utilized for this task and release the Army units so that the operational preparedness and effectiveness of the Army does not suffer. There is also a need to institutionalise and centralize Command and control of the forces including intelligence agencies through a Central Government fiat. The central and state governments are required to work out viable and similar compensation package for the families of the causalities of all the forces, which should ideally be at par with operational causalities in a war situation.

Creation of a counter terrorist training centre under the aegis of the Ministry of Home to train troops for these operations which are distinctly different from normal violence or law & order situation will also be beneficial.