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Vinod Anand
ECONOMIC growth is defined as the steady process
of increasing productive capacity of the economy,
and hence of increasing national income. In other
words, economic growth is the overtime change in
national income. And once this overtime change is
divided by the national income, it gives the rate
of economic growth. Beyond that is the equilibrium
rate of economic growth that is the rate at which
investment equals savings. In symbolic terms,
economic growth is defined as dY/dt, where Y is
national income, and the rate of economic growth
is [dY/dt] divided by Y, and the equilibrium rate
of economic growth is the one at which I= S.
The analysis of economic growth has played an
increasingly important role in economics. On the
one hand, awareness of the problems of developing
countries and inapplicability of conventional
tools to these problems has led to the development
of a whole body of theoretical and descriptive
economics concerned with them. On the other hand,
the shift of emphasis away from the problem of
persistent unemployment in advanced industrialized
capitalist economies towards the problem of full
employment has naturally led to the questions of
what determines the rate at which the economy
grows over time. No definite answers to this issue
have yet emerged, but the general emphasis is on
the rate of growth of the labour force, the
production of national income saved and invested
and the rate of technological improvements, as
being the main determinants. The economic theories
of growth have been rather abstract and
formalistic, and much more attention has been paid
to the various growth models than to their
empirical and practical relevance, which is fairly
low. We must remember that our concern is with
economic growth that arises out of the fact that
the greater the rate of growth of the economy, the
greater, other things being equal, the increase in
the level of well-being.
Hence, comparisons between growth rates of the
western and other countries have given the
impression that the level of well-being does not
increase as rapidly as it might be, which has in
turn led to the search for new policies to
stimulate growth. This is basically due to the
lack of the percolation or the trickle-down
effect. The benefits of economic growth fail to
reach the masses because of this failure. Hence,
there has occurred a shift from macro to micro
strategies i.e., from economic growth to income
distribution issues. During earlier times
(especially during the fifties), the emphasis was
initially on macro issues linked with economic
growth. In other words, the policy was in terms of
emphasizing growth but weighing the growth
performance by the distributional record. This
strategy was subject to the percolation or
trickle-down effect, according to which countries
with moderate to rapid rates of aggregate economic
growth would succeed in upgrading the economic
condition of significant numbers of their people.
But in later years, there was a shift from micro
to macro strategies in terms of emphasizing
changing poverty, inequality and unemployment as
the principal indicators of development.
In essence, countries had initially what we term
as growth mania. In other words, it was greatly
felt that once the economy had a high rate of
growth, it will surely trickle-down to the masses.
But, growth mania is shown to be a myth. The
earlier outlook (from macro to micro) has
miserably failed now and the countries have
shifted from growth to distribution. Growth mania
has now lost its charms, and countries now focus
on micro development through area-specific and
target-specific programmes as has happened in
India over the years.
Economic growth was no unheard of before the 20th
century. The 18th century economists had a lively
awareness of the opportunities for economic
expansion through innovation, through trade, and
through division of labour, and they started
worrying about what is termed as the growth index,
which is like a national flag or a national
airline. A national plan for economic growth was
then deemed an essential item in the paraphernalia
of every new nation state. It was felt that to be
with growth is manifestly to be with it, and like
speed itself, the faster the better.
But this thesis was inverted in the late fifties,
and most of the nations shifted from the first
strategy to the second one, emphasizing
distributional issue more than growth strategies.
The growth mania has now become a myth, and
rightly so. If the countries are interested to
achieve a higher rate of economic growth and wish
to give it top priority they should fully
eliminate the non-friendly barriers that provide
bottlenecks to the trickle-down effect so that the
benefits (both direct and indirect) reach the
masses. But it is a fact and a truth that it is
not possible to fully eliminate these non-friendly
barriers (essentially because of the role of the
so-called political entrepreneurs and their
supporters). And, hence, countries should focus on
distributional issues, and through them achieve a
higher rate of growth. We must not, therefore,
rush for growth, but we should always rush for
distributional issues. This step would by itself
push growth. Such a strategy would lead to the
overall well-being of the whole nation.
In the context of India, let me add that, apart
from focusing on the distributional issues as we
have said above, the concerned authorities should
find effective ways and means to consolidate huge
amount of money that floats continuously in the
black market and also is continuously generated
through rent-seeking and directly unproductive
profit-seeking activities by the so-called
political entrepreneurs and their supporters ( in
the terminology of the “New Political Economy”)
who involve in all kinds of nefarious activities
for their self- interests. Once all this is
consolidated, India would soon emerge as the super
power.
[The writer is former professor of economics at
Allhabad University and former Fellow Indian
Institute of Advanced Study Shimla and is a well
know poet]
BACK
The powerful cheat in Pakistan
THE government banks and private financial
institutions waived loans worth Rs60 billion
during the 8 year from 1999 to 2007.
Those who got their loans written off include
politicians, bureaucrats, former military
officials and various business groups. The finical
institutions which got their loans written off
include National Bank, Pak-Kuwait Investment, IDBP,
Pak-Oman Investment, Agricultural Development
Bank, SME Bank, Bank of Khyber, Punjab Provincial
Cooperative Bank, Pak-Libya Holding, Saudi-Pak
Investment and IDBP. All these institutions are
incorporated under ‘Banking Companies Ordinance’
and supervised by State Bank of Pakistan.
State bank of Pakistan being the regulatory
authority issues the guidelines to all financial
institutions for writing of irrecoverable loans.
The present write offs by banking companies being
reported in media were carried under guidelines of
State Bank’s Circular no.SD 2/99 date July 16,
1999. Before framing any incentive package to
borrowers, the banks are bound to get approval of
their respective Board of Directors and approval
by the Credit Information Bureau of the State
Bank. All these write off further undergo the
internal audit of respective bank and secreting by
SBP’s. State Banks can also allow writing off
loans for certain debtors, usually those that have
little hope of paying off their loans.
The loan write-off is a normal practice in banking
sector around the world; such moves benefit both
debtors and lenders.
If the borrowers’ who suffer unexpected losses
which are not covered by insurance or their
insurance or guarantees are not enough to repay
the debts, their loans are treated as
non-performing assets and banks can offer certain
incentives for recovery under permission of
regulatory authority. Any write policy initiated
by a Banks in Pakistan to offer its borrowers any
incentive on irrecoverable loans or write offs and
restructuring is for a fixed period of time which
is widely publicized in media and apply to all
borrowers.
In some cases bank loans are written off due to
irresponsible lending which has become the biggest
concern for banks in cases of personal debts. In
countries like Pakistan irresponsible lending on
political or military pressure has been a common
cause of loan defaults and write offs in past when
banks were owned by government. The write offs can
be divided in to four major categories. The first
and the most legitimate being write off in
agriculture or industrial where losses occurred
due to natural calamities like floods, crop
disease or sudden downfall in international
markets which are beyond the control of borrower.
This is done mostly in cases of government
subsidized loans and write offs help the sector to
revive itself in order to protect the jobs and
national produce.
The second category of Write-offs is where the
borrower is unable to repay due to unexpected
losses banks offer to wave off a portion of
interests rather than going through the lengthy
process of litigations. This allows banks a speedy
recovery in return for losing a part of their
profits. The third and major reason for write offs
is irresponsible lending’s especially in personal
loans, where the loans are not covered. Such
write-offs are very common in countries where
consumer credit is easily available.
The fourth and the common cause of write-offs in
Pakistan is the irresponsible lending under
pressure of military or civilian government
officials.
During second regime of Mian Nawaz Sharif, a huge
number of taxi cars were imported without any
planning. The powerful exporters who were unable
to sell these taxi cars influenced the government
to force commercial banks to finance these
vehicles. There was little credit left for
industrial sector, almost half of the industry
went out of business because of non availability
of working capital. The biggest sufferers were
small cotton ginners, oil extraction industry,
power looms and rice processing sector which are
the biggest job providers in Punjab and Sindh
provinces’.
In order to revive the small industry, the State
Bank allowed commercial banks to offer incentive
packages of these defaults during Parvez Musharraf
early regime.
The second sector which was badly hit during Nawaz
Sharif’s second regime was agriculture. As the
government was comprised of politicians from major
industrial families, loans for big industry like
Sugar, cement and textile were provided on
political influence which resulted decrease in
agricultural credit and as such huge defaults
occurred in farming community. During early years
of Shaukat Aziz, the agriculture sector was given
a relief package for small agricultural loans
where all or part of interests were waved off.
This greatly helped the agriculture sector to
revive and grow at an exceptional rate during
Pervez Musharaf’s regime. A part of write-offs
during Musharaf’s regime consists these two
categories which are transparent and legitimate.
The major portion of write-offs of loans is not
covered under above two categories. The so called
‘managed write-offs’ can be further divided in to
two categories. The first being the big loans
advanced on political or government pressure to
big fishes by private banks. Such write-offs are
mainly an issue between the management of the bank
and its shareholders. While the second and most
serious is irresponsible lending by government
owned institutions like NBP and Bank of Punjab on
government pressure.
In most of the cases these loans are not covered
or under covered by mortgaged assets and there is
little hope of recovery from big fishes. This is
where the big scam lies.
In both above cases, manipulation is not possible
without active participation of Board of Director
of respective Bank and State Bank’s officials. The
powerful industrialist families and groups first
get loans by offering nonexistent or grossly
undervalued assets as mortgage and later force the
bank and SBP to write of these loans. The defaults
in these cases are invariably wilful as banks
official are under pressure for not to initiate
recovery proceedings. This kind of write offs has
been widely used as political bribe and proved to
be effective toll to buy the political loyalties
during Musharraf regime. The beneficiaries were
the powerful retired generals, political families
and big industrialists with right connections.
Only a high level powerful and independent
institution or a commission can sort out these
cases from those of legitimate write-offs. However
bringing these involved in this scam to justice
would not be an easy job in given social and
political system. Even if such commission is able
to identify the culprits, the recovery would be
next to impossible. Most of those involved have
already transferred their major assets overseas
and have insufficient assets to cover the written
off loans inside Pakistan.
Also most of industrial sectors are controlled by
few families and in case of action against them;
they will try to collapse the entire industrial
activity thus bringing the government to knees.
The present storm in teacup is not going to result
in to recovery of public money in present social
and political structure where government and
Supreme Court of Pakistan with all their might
were unable to end the sugar crisis. However it
will provide some spice to news media and result
in exposing some names of powerful, which already
doesn’t enjoy much public respect or integrity. In
order to avoid such situations in future, we need
to rebuild and strengthen the institutions.
A strong and independent State Bank of Pakistan is
vital to effectively monitor the functions of
banking companies. Also there needs to be an
independent accountability commission which can
probe such irregularities without fear or favour.
BACK
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